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Introduction 
?
The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal’s (CFA) decision in Democratic 
Republic of Congo v FG Hemisphere Associates LLC,1 arrived at on 8 June 
2011 by a narrow majority of 3 to 2, is undoubtedly a landmark case 
in the legal history of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
(HKSAR). For the fi rst time, the CFA made use of the procedure in 
Art 158(3) of the Basic Law of the HKSAR to refer Basic Law provisions 
to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (SCNPC) 
for interpretation. The case was mainly decided as a matter of consti-
tutional law, particularly the constitutional relationship between the 
HKSAR and the Central People’s Government (CPG) in Beijing, but 
it also has signifi cant ramifi cations as regards the application of interna-
tional law in the HKSAR.
The commentaries in this Focus section on the Congo case explore 
different dimensions of the case. Benny Tai seeks to understand the deci-
sion from the political science perspective of a “constitutional game”. 
PY Lo analyses both the majority and minority judgments in this case 
which he describes as “a watershed event”, and explores the “gateway” it 
opens to “mainland Chinese legisprudence”. PJ Yap questions whether it 
was necessary for the CFA in this case to make a reference to the SCNPC, 
and suggests that it was possible for the CFA majority to arrive at the 
same decision simply on the basis of the common law. Tony Carty is criti-
cal of the CFA’s decision – both the majority and minority – insofar as it 
fails to take seriously the relevant issues of international law and of the 
relationship between international law and domestic law. Eric Cheung 
is critical of the manner in which the CPG’s Offi ce of the Commissioner 
of Foreign Affairs in Hong Kong intervened in this case, as well as some 
aspects of the CFA decision. Finally, Simon Young expresses concern 
about the broader implications of the CFA decision in the Congo case 
regarding immunity from responsibility for human rights violations and 
from other processes under international law. 
In this author’s opinion, the following three features of the Congo 
decision are particularly signifi cant. First, the majority of the CFA judges 
in this case not only referred the relevant Basic Law provisions to the 
SCNPC for interpretation, but also expressed their own views on the 
substantive questions concerned and rendered a provisional judgment 
1 [2011] 4 HKC 151.
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in favour of the appellants. Secondly, on the issues of the “one voice” 
doctrine (i.e. the court and the executive speaking in one voice on par-
ticular matters of foreign affairs) and the “act of state”, the majority 
judgment went beyond the existing English common law and modifi ed 
or adapted it to the circumstances and context of the HKSAR as part 
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Thirdly, the majority judg-
ment in effect decided that in the domain of foreign sovereign immunity, 
the judicial practice required by the Basic Law is closer to the system 
that prevailed in the United States before its enactment of the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976 than that in the United Kingdom 
under English common law before its enactment of the State Immunity 
Act 1978. These three aspects are elaborated below. 
Not Merely Reference to the SCNPC
Under Art 158(3) of the Basic Law, the CFA is obliged to refer what the 
CFA has called an “excluded provision” of the Basic Law to the SCNPC for 
interpretation once what the CFA has called the “necessity condition” and 
“classifi cation condition” are satisfi ed.2 There is nothing in Art 158 which 
suggests that the CFA is required or invited to express its opinions on how 
the excluded provision should be interpreted. This means that it would have 
been perfectly open to the CFA in the present case to keep silent on, and to 
remain neutral on, the interpretive questions concerned, and to postpone 
any judgment on the case (and not to render any provisional judgment or 
make any “provisional orders”3) until and unless the SCNPC pronounces 
on how the relevant Basic Law provisions should be interpreted. 
It is signifi cant that the majority of the CFA in the Congo case chose 
not to adopt this option, but clearly expressed its views on the inter-
pretive questions concerned and rendered a provisional judgment4 on 
the application of the Basic Law and other relevant laws to the facts 
of the case. This manner of dealing with a reference under Art 158(3) 
of the Basic Law set a precedent for the CFA to follow in future refer-
ences. Commenting on a passage on the application of article 158 of the 
Basic Law in the CFA’s judgment in Ng Ka Ling,5 the CFA in the Congo 
2 The terms “excluded provision”, “necessity condition” and “classifi cation condition” were fi rst 
used by the CFA in the Ng Ka Ling case (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4. 
3 See paras 408 and 415 of the judgment. 
4 The majority judgment described its conclusions as “necessarily tentative and provisional”: 
para 183 of the judgment. After the SCNPC issued its interpretation on 26 Aug 2011, the CFA 
issued a judgment on 8 Sept 2011 declaring the provisional judgment fi nal. 
5 (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4.
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case said that “[i]t was not intended to preclude this Court from  expressing 
its view on a question of interpretation which it is bound to refer and 
does refer to the SCNPC. The language of Article 158(3) plainly per-
mits this Court to express its view on the question. What Article 158(3) 
precludes is the making of a fi nal judgment before a reference is made in 
a case where a reference is required.”6
The advantage of this approach is that it enables the CFA’s views on 
the interpretive questions referred to the SCNPC to be made known to 
and considered by the SCNPC as it proceeds to work out the answers to 
the questions. Indeed, if we examine the four questions which the CFA 
referred to the SCNPC in the Congo case,7 we will see that they are actu-
ally simple questions each of which can be answered by a simple “yes” or 
“no”, and the answers that the CFA majority would give to the questions 
are obvious from the majority judgment. By formulating the questions 
narrowly and precisely, and by making it clear how the CFA would have 
answered the questions itself, the CFA thus attempted to play a proac-
tive or even guiding (in the sense of providing “guidance” to or map-
ping out the direction for the SCNPC) role in the interpretive process of 
Art 158(3) of the Basic Law. 
On the other hand, this approach is not without possible disad-
vantages and risks. As the CFA has decided in Chong Fung Yuen,8 the 
HKSAR courts adopt the common law approach to the interpretation of 
the Basic Law. This does not mean that the SCNPC is bound to adopt 
the same approach. The Basic Law is, after all, a product of “one country, 
two systems”; it was enacted by the National People’s Congress of the 
PRC, and is both a Chinese law and a Hong Kong law. The possible 
advantage of the CFA referring an “excluded provision” to the SCNPC 
for interpretation under Art 158(3) while keeping silent on, and remain-
ing “neutral” on, how the provision should be interpreted is that the 
Hong Kong court would not assume any responsibility for the interpre-
tation of the provision. Even if the SCNPC interprets it in a manner 
contrary to how a Hong Kong court would interpret it, the responsibility 
is entirely borne by the SCNPC. On the other hand, if the CFA does 
go ahead – as it did in the Congo case – to express its views on how an 
“excluded provision” should be interpreted, the resources of the common 
law – which have been developed in England without any regard to the 
needs of “one country, two systems” – may not be adequate for this pur-
pose. This brings us to our second point. 
6 Para 398 of the judgment. 
7 See para 407 of the judgment.
8 (2001) 4 HKCFAR 211.
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Going Beyond the English Common Law
In the Congo case, the CFA majority had to stretch – or to go beyond – 
the existing English common law in order to reach its provisional judg-
ment that the HKSAR should follow the PRC’s policy or doctrine of 
“absolute” immunity for foreign sovereigns. There are two crucial points 
in the majority judgment at which this was done. The fi rst relates to the 
scope of the “one voice” doctrine. The second relates to the concept of 
an “act of state”.
On the fi rst point, the majority judgment said: 
“The policy that the courts and the executive should ‘speak with one voice’ 
dates back to the nineteenth century. … Most commonly, the guidance 
sought by the courts from the executive relates to a party’s claim to the status 
of a sovereign or the territorial limits of a State’s jurisdiction. Lord Pannick 
QC submits that the ‘one voice principle’ is limited to such questions, but 
we do not see why that should be so. If in principle it is accepted (as Lord 
Pannick QC accepts) that it is for the executive branch of government to 
determine whether a particular claimant is a sovereign State upon whom the 
forum State should confer immunity, we fail to see why it should not equally 
be for the executive to determine what exceptions may exist to the grant of such 
immunity.”9 
It is noteworthy that there is nothing in English case law (in contrast 
with American case law, which will be discussed in the next section) that 
supports the proposition that the court and the executive should speak 
with one voice on the question of whether a foreign sovereign (that is 
recognised by the executive as a foreign sovereign) is entitled to sovereign 
immunity in proceedings before the court. As stressed by the majority of 
the Court of Appeal and the minority of the CFA in the present case, 
under English law and the law of colonial Hong Kong before the enact-
ment of the State Immunity Act 1978, the question of whether a foreign 
sovereign enjoyed immunity in proceedings before the English or Hong 
Kong court had been regarded as purely a question of law – governed by 
the common law, and also partly by the incorporation of customary inter-
national law into the common law – to be exclusively determined by the 
court without seeking the views of the executive. It was on this basis that 
the common law evolved from the original  doctrine of “absolute immu-
nity” to the subsequent doctrine of “restrictive immunity”. 
9 Paras 240–241 of the judgment. Emphasis supplied.
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On the second point, which relates to the concept of an “act of state” 
which is referred to in Art 19(3) of the Basic Law, the majority judgment 
fi rst pointed out that Art 19(3) “can be read as consistent with the com-
mon law doctrine of act of state”.10 Then it said: 
“The scope of the common law act of state doctrine is imprecise, … These 
common law decisions dealing with acts of state in the fi eld of foreign affairs 
are in substance consistent with Article 19(3). Is the act by the CPG of deter-
mining the policy of state immunity applicable to the HKSAR properly viewed 
as an act of state coming within the concept of ‘acts of state such as defence 
and foreign affairs’ in Article 19(3)? In our view, the provisional answer, 
consistent with the common law and our interpretation of Article 19(3), 
is ‘Yes’. It involves the CPG’s determination of the PRC’s policy in its deal-
ings with foreign States with regard to state immunity. … It would follow 
that FGH’s submission that determination of such rule is a matter for the 
HKSAR courts and not the CPG must be rejected. It is a matter over which 
the HKSAR courts lack jurisdiction.”11 
Here, it is again noteworthy that there is nothing in the existing English 
case law which supports the proposition – which in this author’s opinion 
is indeed original and innovative from the perspective of English com-
mon law – that the executive’s determination of the content or scope of 
the legal rule on foreign sovereign immunity is an act of state and that 
the rule so enunciated by the executive is binding on the court. The CFA 
majority was completely on uncharted waters when they developed this 
proposition. As pointed out by the minority in the CFA and the major-
ity in the Court of Appeal in the present case, in English common law, 
whether a foreign sovereign enjoyed sovereign immunity in a particular 
case had been treated as a question of law to be answered exclusively by 
the courts, and there was no room for the executive to enunciate any rule 
or policy on this matter. There was thus no room for any act of state on 
the part of the executive as far as questions of sovereign immunity were 
concerned. 
The majority judgment in the present case therefore raises the inter-
esting and important question of whether, and, if so, how, the CPG – 
which (in contrast with the NPC or SCNPC) under the Basic Law does 
not enjoy any law-making power with regard to the HKSAR12 – may 
10 Para 345.
11 Paras 348, 352 and 355. Emphasis supplied.
12 Under Art 18 of the Basic Law, the SCNPC may apply a national law (made by the NPC 
or SCNPC) to the HKSAR by adding the law to the list of national laws applicable to the 
HKSAR in Annex III to the Basic Law. 
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make a “policy” (such as “the policy of state immunity”) which effec-
tively operates as a source of law in the HKSAR. This brings us to the 
third and fi nal issue to be discussed here.
Borrowing from the American Model 
Both the majority and the minority of the CFA in the Congo case dis-
cussed and considered the American case law that governed foreign sov-
ereign immunity in the United States before the enactment of the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) in 1976. The minority pointed 
out that the pre-FSIA American regime, in giving the executive the 
power both to enunciate a general policy of foreign sovereign immunity 
and to give to the court “suggestions of immunity” in individual cases, 
was an unsatisfactory and undesirable system in that it enabled politi-
cal considerations – particularly considerations of what was “politically 
expedient” – to affect judicial decisions in cases where foreign sovereigns 
were sued.13 On the other hand, the majority in effect decided that by 
virtue of the nature of foreign sovereign immunity, the constitutional 
status of the HKSAR and the provisions of the Basic Law,14 the legal 
regime of sovereign immunity in the HKSAR is to some extent similar to 
the pre-FSIA American regime, insofar as under both regimes, the exec-
utive of the national government – which is constitutionally charged 
with the conduct of foreign affairs – has, as a matter of the constitutional 
allocation of powers within the legal system,15 and in the absence of any 
13 See paras 86, 90, 489–491 of the judgment. With respect, whether the pre-FSIA American 
regime was a good system was one question; whether, as a matter of the true interpretation of 
the Basic Law, the applicable regime in the HKSAR regarding sovereign immunity is actually 
similar to the pre-FSIA American regime is another question. The two questions should not be 
confused with one another.
14 See para 226 of the judgment. 
15 The concept of the constitutional allocation of powers is crucial to the majority judgment. See 
paras 233, 266, 275, 321 and 331 of the judgment. In this regard, the majority distinguished the 
UK position from that of the HKSAR under the Basic Law, on the ground that the UK does 
not have a written constitution and the British courts determined for themselves (as a matter 
of the constitutional allocation of powers) that they had the power (without consulting the 
executive) to decide on questions of sovereign immunity as a matter of common law (before 
the enactment of the State Immunity Act 1978). See paras 257 and 276 of the judgment. The 
majority judgment also pointed out that even under the State Immunity Act (SIA), the UK 
executive has a considerable role to play: “… the SIA 1978 empowers the executive, by Order 
in Council, to restrict or extend the immunities and privileges conferred on a foreign State 
by the Act if it should appear to the government that such privileges and immunities exceed 
those accorded by the law of that State in relation to the United Kingdom; or are less than 
those required by any international agreement to which that State and the United Kingdom 
are parties. In other words, the SIA 1978 empowers the executive to calibrate the extent of 
state immunity granted to a foreign State on the basis of reciprocity and in accordance with the 
international rights and obligations of the United Kingdom.” (para 258)
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national law made by the national legislature on the subject,16 the power 
to enunciate a national policy on foreign sovereign immunity that the 
courts should regard as binding. Such a policy effectively operates as a 
source of law. 
The following scholarly comments on the pre-FSIA American 
regime (“the pre-FSIA regime”) are instructive. Charney points out that 
one possible interpretation of the pre-FSIA regime is that “the execu-
tive branch has sole authority to make policy and law with regard to 
certain foreign affairs matters, it may also have the authority to infl u-
ence some court determinations unilaterally”.17 According to Bradley’s 
analysis, in the pre-FSIA regime the courts in effect “recognize[d] an 
independent lawmaking power”18 with regard to matters of sovereign 
immunity on the part of the executive branch of government that is 
charged with the conduct of foreign affairs. He pointed out that the 
system may be understood as a “regime [of] judicial deference to execu-
tive branch lawmaking”.19 Henkin’s description of the pre-FSIA regime 
is as follows: “if the Executive announced a national policy in regard to 
immunity generally, or for the particular case, that policy was law for 
the courts and binding upon them, regardless of what international law 
might say about it.”20 He pointed out that one possible interpretation of 
the regime is that it “represent[ed] some broad principle of Presidential 
‘legislative power’ in foreign affairs”,21 i.e. the “view that the President 
can declare national policy in foreign affairs with legal effect binding on 
the courts”.22
Such American jurisprudence may be borrowed by us in the HKSAR 
to understand and explain the majority decision of the CFA in recogniz-
ing the binding force of the CPG’s determination under Arts 13 and 19 
of the Basic Law of the national policy on foreign sovereign  immunity. 
The overriding authority of such a determination may be further 
buttressed by Art 160 of the Basic Law and the SCNPC Decision of 
16 The CFA majority stressed that the existing regime of foreign sovereign immunity in the PRC 
is such that there is no law (enacted by the legislative organ of the state) on the subject and the 
matter is dealt with by executive policy: see paras 259 and 370. In para 370, the court stated: 
“[N]o national law on state immunity has been promulgated, the matter being treated, as in 
many other countries, as a matter of national policy determined by the executive and adhered 
to by the courts. There can be little doubt that if a national state immunity law were to come 
into existence, it would be applied to the HKSAR.” 
17 Jonathan I. Charney, “Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations” (1989) 83 Am J Int’l L 805 
at 807. 
18 Curtis A. Bradley, “Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs” (2000) 86 Va L Rev 649 at 711.
19 Ibid., at 712.
20 Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution (1972) at 59.
21 Ibid., at 60.
22 Loc. cit. 
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February 1997, which govern the extent to which pre-1997 laws may sur-
vive the handover, and which require the modifi cation and adaptation 
of such laws so as to render them consistent with the post-1997 constitu-
tional status of the HKSAR and the international rights and obligations 
of the CPG. This explains why the fourth question referred by the CFA 
to the SCNPC for interpretation in the present case concerns, inter alia, 
Art 160 and the SCNPC Decision of February 1997.
 Albert H. Y. Chen*
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